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Essay 
Why Ratification of the U.N. Convention of the 
Law of the Sea May Violate Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution 
Julian G. Ku  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States remains the most important seafaring 
nation that is not a member of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).1 Despite vigorous efforts by 
both the Bush and Obama Administrations, the U.S. Senate has 
continued to refuse to give consent to accession. Most of the 
objections to U.S. membership are based on policy 
disagreements.2 
In addition to policy objections, opponents of ratification 
have also offered constitutional objections to joining UNCLOS. 
The first set of objections focuses on the authority created by 
UNCLOS to manage undersea resources outside of the 
jurisdiction of particular countries.3 Numerous opponents have 
 
  Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, 
Maurice A. Deane School of Law, Hofstra University. J.D., Yale Law School, 
B.A., Yale University. The author would like to thank Jean Galbraith, Vicki 
Jackson, and Samuel Estreicher for their comments on earlier versions of this 
Essay.  
 1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; Status of the Agreement Relating to the 
Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 10 December 1982, United Nations, https://treaties.un.org/pages
/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6-a&chapter=21&lang=en 
(last visited Jan. 4, 2016). 
 2. The Law of the Sea Convention: Hearing on Senate Treaty Document 
103-39 Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 13–14 (2012) 
(statement of Steven Groves) [hereinafter Groves, Hearing on Senate Treaty 
Document 103-39]. See generally Raul Pedrozo, Is It Time for the United States 
to Join the Law of the Sea Convention?, 41 J. MAR. L. & COM. 151 (2010) 
(explaining the Obama Administration’s support for U.S. ratification). 
 3. Groves, Hearing on Senate Treaty Document 103-39, supra note 2, at 
30 (“Now, finally, this treaty has allowed for us, on a provisional basis, to 
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also suggested that UNCLOS impermissibly authorizes an 
international organization to tax United States citizens or 
companies.4 The second set of objections relate to the 
constitutionality of the treaty’s complex system of binding 
dispute settlement.5 
In general, the legal academy has not seriously considered 
any of these constitutional objections to UNCLOS. Most prior 
studies of UNCLOS have been devoted to analyzing issues of 
international law and institutional design.6 Much of this 
literature has also openly advocated for U.S. ratification of 
UNCLOS. None have seriously reviewed or analyzed 
constitutional objections.7 
This Essay seeks to address this gap in the academic 
literature by considering what I believe to be the most serious 
constitutional problem with accession to UNCLOS: the 
compulsory dispute settlement system. This work draws heavily 
on two important U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the past ten 
years that considered the constitutional issues raised in U.S. 
participation in other analogous systems of international 
 
participate and influence the work of various entities, such as the Commission 
on the Limits on the Continental Shelf and the International Seabed Authority, 
the body that regulates the exploration, development, exploration of 
international areas beyond national jurisdiction, such as oil, gas, and nonliving 
resources under the seabed and subsoil.”). 
 4. Id. at 16 (“Other critics have suggested that the convention gives the 
United Nations the authority to levy some kind of global tax.”). 
 5. Id. at 10 (“I know some are concerned that the treaty’s provisions for 
binding dispute settlement would impinge on our sovereignty.”). 
 6. See, e.g., A. O. ADEDE, THE SYSTEM FOR SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A 
DRAFTING HISTORY AND A COMMENTARY (1987); UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY (Myron H. Nordquist ed., 1989). 
See also NATALIE KLEIN, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE U.N. CONVENTION ON 
THE LAW OF THE SEA (2005); CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION. (Jon M. Van 
Dyke ed., 1985); THE UNITED STATES AND THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA 
CONVENTION: THE CASE PRO & CON (George Galdorisi ed., 1994); John A. C. 
Cartner & Q.C. Edgar Gold, Commentary in Reply to “Is It Time for the United 
States to Join the Law of the Sea Convention,” 42 J. MAR. L. & COM. 49, 54 
(2011). 
 7. See, e.g., John A. Duff, The United States and the Law of the Sea 
Convention: Sliding Back from Accession and Ratification, 11 OCEAN & 
COASTAL L.J. 1, 2 (2006); John Norton Moore, UNCLOS Key to Increasing 
Navigational Freedom, 12 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 459 (2008); Bernard H. Oxman, 
United States Interests in the Law of the Sea Convention, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 167, 
168 (1994). See Cartner & Gold, supra note 6, at 54; THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION, supra note 6; CONSENSUS AND 
CONFRONTATION, supra note 6. 
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dispute settlement. In Medellín v. Texas and Sanchez-Llamas v. 
Oregon, the Supreme Court considered the impact of decisions 
from the International Court of Justice, and its holdings strongly 
suggest that there are meaningful constitutional limits on U.S. 
participation in international courts and tribunals.8 While the 
U.S. government has recognized the potential constitutional 
issues created by one aspect of UNCLOS dispute settlement,9 
this Essay will explain that its proposal for eliding these issues 
is insufficient to completely resolve the constitutional problems 
I will identify. 
This Essay begins by offering background regarding the 
system of dispute settlement created by UNCLOS. In Part II, the 
work considers possible constitutional limits imposed on U.S. 
participation with international courts as gleaned from recent 
Supreme Court decisions as well as other important legal 
historical research on U.S. participation in systems of 
international adjudication in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. The Essay goes on in Part III to argue that these 
limits are most clearly exceeded by the treaty’s requirement that 
U.S. courts give automatic enforcement to decisions of the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’s Sea-Bed 
Disputes Chamber. Less clear, but non-trivial constitutional 
questions are also raised by the power of other UNCLOS bodies 
to issue compulsory orders binding on the United States. The 
U.S. government’s strategy treating these provisions as non-self-
executing alleviates, but does not completely solve these 
constitutional problems. Of course, these constitutional 
infirmities do not mean that the U.S. should never ratify 
UNCLOS. Instead, supporters of U.S. ratification need to 
frankly acknowledge these constitutional weaknesses and 
propose a more serious way to resolve them.  
 
 8. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 527 (2008) (quoting Youngstown Sheet 
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)) (“A non-self-executing 
treaty . . . is one that was ratified with the understanding that it is not to have 
domestic effect of its own force. That understanding precludes the assertion that 
Congress has implicitly authorized the President—acting on his own—to 
achieve precisely the same result. We therefore conclude, given the absence of 
congressional legislation, that the non-self-executing treaties at issue here did 
not ‘express[ly] or implied[ly]’ vest the President with the unilateral authority 
to make them self-executing.”); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 360 
(2006) (“We therefore conclude . . . that claims under Article 36 of the Vienna 
Convention may be subjected to the same procedural default rules that apply 
generally to other federal law claims.”). 
 9. THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 110-09, at 17 
(2007) [hereinafter Senate Exec. Doc. 110-09]. 
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II. UNCLOS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
The adoption of UNCLOS in 1982 marked the conclusion of 
one of the most ambitious and comprehensive efforts to create a 
worldwide system of legal rules governing the world’s oceans and 
undersea resources.10 The United States and numerous other 
industrialized nations initially refused to sign UNCLOS and 
were largely responsible for forcing a second round of 
negotiations culminating in a slightly revised 1994 agreement.11 
President Clinton signed the revised version of UNCLOS in 
1996.12 Presidents Bush and Obama both submitted UNCLOS 
to the Senate for its advice and consent, but the Senate has thus 
far refused to move to consider the treaty.13 
UNCLOS has numerous provisions governing questions as 
diverse as the ‘rules of the road’ for ships traversing the high 
seas, definitions of land and sea features, the determination of 
maritime boundaries and economic zones built from those land 
features, scientific research, management of living marine 
resources, and development of natural resources drawn from the 
sea-bed beyond the limits of any national jurisdiction.14 
Recognizing that UNCLOS regulates a wide and diverse set 
of issues, the drafters of UNCLOS sought to create mechanisms 
for states-parties to resolve disputes under the Convention 
peacefully. In Section 1 of Part XV, UNCLOS encourages states-
parties to resolve disputes through negotiations, inquiries, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, exchanges of views, or 
judicial settlement.15 These traditional mechanisms of dispute 
settlement are completely voluntary.16 
However, the UNCLOS conference was not satisfied with 
 
 10. See Duff, supra note 7, at 1 (“As of August 26, 2005, there were 149 
parties to [UNCLOS] . . . . For all the parties to the Convention virtually all 
legal questions concerning the law of the sea are now governed by the 
Convention.”). 
 11. Id. at 2. 
 12. See Senate Exec. Doc. 110-09, supra note 9, at 2–3. 
 13. Id. See also Sean Patrick Mahard, Blackwater’s New Battlefield: 
Toward a Regulatory Regime in the United States for Privately Armed 
Contractors Operating at Sea, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 331, 344 (2014) (“In 
the summer of 2012, thirty-four senators were staunchly against UNCLOS, 
which makes reaching the sixty-seven votes required to ratify the treaty 
impossible.”). 
 14. See UNCLOS art. 279–299. 
 15. Id. at art. 279–285. 
 16. Id. 
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merely encouraging states-parties to settle their disputes 
peacefully through voluntary settlement. If they cannot resolve 
any disputes through conciliation or negotiations, states-parties 
are required to submit “any dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention . . . to the court 
or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section.”17 
States-parties must choose one of four possible methods of 
dispute resolution: the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), an 
arbitral tribunal established under Annex VII for disputes under 
the Convention as a whole, or a special arbitral tribunal 
established according to Annex VIII for disputes related to 
fisheries and the marine environment.18 If a state does not 
choose a method of dispute settlement, the state will be deemed 
to have accepted arbitration under Annex VII.19 
States-parties may also avail themselves of provisional 
measures under UNCLOS. Once a dispute has been submitted 
to one of the courts or arbitral tribunals authorized by UNCLOS, 
that court or arbitral tribunal “may prescribe any provisional 
measures which it considers appropriate under the 
circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the parties to 
the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine 
environment, pending the final decision.”20 In cases where an 
arbitral tribunal has not yet been constituted, the ITLOS or 
Seabed Disputes Chamber may prescribe provisional 
measures.21 Importantly, UNCLOS states that all parties to a 
dispute “shall comply promptly with any provisional measures 
prescribed under this article.”22 
Indeed, despite the complexity of the dispute settlement 
system and the various options for states-parties, UNCLOS 
makes it clear that all forms of dispute settlement are binding. 
As UNCLOS states in Article 296, “Any decision rendered by a 
court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall be 
final and shall be complied with by all the parties to the 
dispute.”23 The use of mandatory language removes any doubt 
as to whether rulings issued pursuant to dispute settlement 
 
 17. Id. at art. 286. 
 18. Id. at art. 287. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at art. 290. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at art. 296. 
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system are binding.24 
No matter what method for dispute resolution the states-
parties choose under Article 287, all states-parties will be 
deemed to have accepted the jurisdiction of the Sea-Bed 
Disputes Chamber for questions concerning the sea-bed.25 Under 
Article 187, all states-parties to UNCLOS must agree to have 
disputes relating to the exploration and management of sea-bed 
settled with finality.26 UNCLOS states-parties involved in a 
dispute may also agree to separate arbitration of a sea-bed 
dispute,27 but all other disputes fall within the exclusive domain 
of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber.28 
The Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber not only has jurisdiction for 
all disputes between states-parties to the Convention, but it will 
also have jurisdiction over disputes “between parties to a 
contract, being States Parties, the Authority or the Enterprise, 
state enterprises and natural or juridical persons.”29 
This aspect of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber’s jurisdiction 
makes it highly unusual as compared to the rest of the UNCLOS 
system and to most international tribunals. For instance, the 
ICJ’s jurisdiction is limited to nation-states,30 but individuals, 
corporations, nation-states, and the international agency 
managing the Sea-Bed (the Authority) are all given direct access 
to the jurisdiction of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber.31 
Interestingly, the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber has 
jurisdiction over disputes between the Authority and private 
companies regarding “the interpretation or application of a 
relevant contract or a plan of work” or “acts or omissions of a 
 
 24. 5 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982, supra 
note 6, at 82–84 n.2 (describing UNCLOS’ drafting history, “[e]mphasiz[ing] the 
finality of decisions and the obligation of the parties to the dispute to comply 
with them”). 
 25. See UNCLOS at art. 287. 
 26. Id. at art. 187. 
 27. Id. at art. 188. 
 28. Id. at art. 187 (“The seabed disputes chamber shall have jurisdiction 
under this Part and the Annexes relating thereto in disputes with respect to 
activities in the Area falling within the following categories: . . . (f) any other 
disputes for which the jurisdiction of the Chamber is specifically provided in 
this Convention.”). 
 29. Id. 
 30. U.N. Charter art. 92–96 (noting that the Statute of the ICJ is annexed 
to and functions “[i]n accordance with” Article 92 of the UN Charter); Statute 
of the International Court of Justice, art. 34, 59 Stat. 1055, T. S. No. 993 (1945) 
[hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
 31. UNCLOS art. 187. 
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Party to the contract” relating to activities in the international 
seabed area beyond national jurisdictions (called the “Area” by 
UNCLOS).32 Such private companies can initiate proceedings 
against the Authority whether or not they are sponsored by a 
state-party to the Convention.33 
Unlike the other methods of dispute settlement, UNCLOS 
has specific provisions for the enforcement of Sea-Bed Disputes 
Chamber judgments. Not only are decisions of the Sea-Bed 
Disputes Chamber binding on parties before the Chamber, but 
Article 39 of Annex VI states, “[D]ecisions of the Chamber shall 
be enforceable in the territories of the States Parties in the same 
manner as judgments or orders of the highest court of the State 
Party in whose territory the enforcement is sought.”34 
It is perhaps not surprising, however, that the Sea-Bed 
Disputes Chamber’s judgments have this status given the 
involvement of private companies in actions before the Sea-Bed 
Disputes Chamber. Presumably, this provision would prevent 
private parties from seeking to have national courts question the 
decisions of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber. This provision, as I 
will discuss infra, imposes a broad obligation for domestic 
enforcement of the Chamber’s decisions. This “enforcement” 
clause raises the most serious constitutional issues for U.S. 
accession to UNCLOS. 
Finally, it is worth noting that ITLOS’s jurisdiction is also 
not limited to disputes between states. Article 20 of the ITLOS 
Statute “shall be open to entities other than States Parties” 
where any other agreement conferred jurisdiction on ITLOS.35 
This means that ITLOS may potentially hear disputes on legal 
questions beyond the interpretation or application of the 
Convention. Most importantly, it suggests that ITLOS could 
acquire jurisdiction in “cases involving a private commercial 
corporation or an intergovernmental organization, or even a 
non-governmental organization, as a party.”36 
In sum, UNCLOS creates a system of compulsory dispute 
settlement where states-parties must choose one of four methods 
 
 32. Id. at (c). 
 33. Id. 
 34. UNCLOS, supra note 1, annex VI, art. 39. 
 35. Statute of International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea art. 20 § 2, Dec. 
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 566. 
 36. Thomas A. Mensah, The Dispute Settlement Regime of the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 2 Max Planck Y.B. U.N. L. 307, 321 
(1998). 
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of international adjudication. Each of these adjudicatory options 
results in a binding judgment which states-parties are obligated 
to comply with. All states-parties must accept the jurisdiction of 
the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber for disputes related to the Area, 
and this jurisdiction extends to non-state parties such as natural 
persons and business enterprises. Moreover, UNCLOS makes 
judgments of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber enforceable in the 
domestic legal systems of states-parties as if those judgments 
were those of the highest domestic court. 
III. THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS 
Although the United States has participated in forms of 
international dispute resolution since its founding,37 the 
constitutional consequences of binding judgments issued by 
international tribunals are rarely considered by scholars and 
barely addressed by courts. Prior to the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and Medellín v. Texas, 
most commentary on the constitutionality of U.S. participation 
in international courts dismissed such concerns are largely 
overblown.38 For instance, when I advocated for applying a clear 
statement rule to mitigate or limit delegations to international 
courts and tribunals, several commentators dismissed my 
delegation concerns as mistaken or mere “myth.”39 
However, the combination of those two Supreme Court 
decisions and recent new historical research about 
constitutional limits on the U.S. participation in slave-trade 
tribunals and international prize courts has re-framed this 
debate and highlighted the constitutional challenge posed by the 
U.S. participation in international courts. International courts 
will continue to play an important role in world affairs,40 and as 
a result, constitutional limits on U.S. participation can and 
should be defined. 
 
 37. See generally The Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation (the Jay 
Treaty), U.S.–Gr. Brit., art. VI, Nov. 19, 1795, 8 Stat. 116 (appointing five 
commissioners to settle claims from the Revolutionary War). 
 38. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman and Jennifer Landsidle, The Myth of 
International Delegation, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1693 (2008). 
 39. Compare Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to 
International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. 
REV. 71 (2000), with Guzman, supra note 38, at 1697. 
 40. Julian G. Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court 
Order, 81 WASH. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2006). 
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A. ARTICLE III AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
1. Article III 
The Constitution states that the “judicial power of the 
United States” is vested in “one supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”41 The judges in these courts exercising judicial power 
must be appointed pursuant to the President’s nomination and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate. Those judges must 
also be granted life tenure and receive other protections in order 
to safeguard their political independence.42 
Although the Constitution does not mention any other kind 
of federal judicial body, U.S. history and practice have typically 
allowed some kinds of legal disputes that would otherwise fall 
within the scope of the Article III federal judicial power to be 
resolved by other kinds of courts or tribunals.43 Despite this 
permissive approach, judicial interpretations of Article III have 
nonetheless maintained limitations on the allocation of 
jurisdiction to non-Article III courts. 
Thus, although there is some precedent for non-Article III 
courts in early U.S. history with the establishment of territorial 
tribunals, courts-martial, and consular courts, the real growth 
of Article III jurisprudence coincided with the rise of the 
administrative state in the twentieth century.44 In the seminal 
1932 decision of Crowell v. Benson, the Supreme Court upheld 
the use of non-Article III administrative courts to determine 
facts in cases.45 The Court noted that in most cases, such courts 
were appropriately authorized to resolve disputes involving 
“public rights,” or disputes asserting monetary claims against 
the United States. The Crowell Court also opened the door to 
allowing non-Article III courts to resolve even some “private 
rights,” a category which includes most common law actions and 
criminal prosecutions.46 
While private rights may in some cases be allocated to a non-
 
 41. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See, e.g., James Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the 
Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 660–65 (2004) 
(analyzing the Supreme Court’s Article III delegation jurisprudence). 
 44. Id. 
 45. 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932). 
 46. Id. at 47. 
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Article III tribunal, other decisions have imposed strict limits. 
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., saw 
the Court invalidate a portion of the Bankruptcy Act that 
allowed non-Article III bankruptcy judges to decide state law 
claims involving an estate.47 Other cases have required juries for 
private rights cases pursuant to the Seventh Amendment, 
further circumscribing non-Article III bodies.48 The scope of 
these Article III limitations, however, remains unclear since the 
Court permitted certain common law claims to be resolved by an 
administrative agency in Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission v. Schor.49 
The clearest approach to identifying Article III limits would 
focus on requiring that Article III courts maintain appellate 
review over the decisions of non-Article III tribunals.50 Not only 
are state courts subject to Article III appellate review for federal 
issues, but non-Article III tribunals, including administrative 
tribunals, are subject to various forms of appellate review in the 
federal courts. It is likely (although the Court has never ruled so 
explicitly), that retaining appellate review in an Article III court 
should satisfy concerns about the delegation of the federal 
judicial power to non-Article III tribunals.51 As a historical 
matter, at least, scholars have argued that even though 
Congress has created non-Article III courts and tribunals, such 
judicial bodies always remained within the supervisory 
jurisdiction of federal courts.52 
In sum, the Supreme Court has maintained limitations on 
the kinds of disputes that can be delegated to non-Article III 
tribunals, favoring the delegation of judicial power over public 
rights rather than private rights. These limitations, however, 
have not been consistently applied. In any event, scholarly and 
historical practice supports maintaining at least some form of 
 
 47. 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982). 
 48. Granfianciera, S.A. et al. v. Nordbeg, 492 U.S. 33, 61, 64 (1989). 
 49. 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
 50. This approach has received much support in the literature, although it 
has never been directly embraced by the Supreme Court. See Pfander, supra 
note 43, at 647–48 (2004). See also Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, 
Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 
197, 226–28; Richard B. Saphire and Michael E. Solimine, Shoring Up Article 
III: Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REV. 
85, 88, 138–39 (1988). 
 51. The most thorough textual defense of this approach was offered by 
Professor James Pfander. See Pfander, supra note 43, at 647–48. 
 52. Id. at 653. 
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Article III appellate review over any non-Article III tribunals 
ruling on matters otherwise within the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. 
B. INTERNATIONAL COURTS: SLAVE-TRADE TRIBUNALS AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURT PRECEDENTS 
Although Article III has not been invoked in any recent 
decision involving international courts, the idea that Article III 
could limit U.S. involvement in international tribunals has a 
long historical pedigree. Thanks to recent research by Professor 
Eugene Kontorovich,53 it is now clear that leading statesmen 
and U.S. government negotiators considered Article III a 
meaningful constitutional limitation when the United States 
considered joining two international courts during the 
nineteenth century. 
First, as Professor Kontorovich details, Article III objections 
played a key role in the U.S. rejection of an 1818 proposal from 
Great Britain inviting the U.S. to join an international 
commission to punish slave traders. Such a commission, which 
several other countries had already agreed to join, would have 
established a trial of slave traders by two commissioners—only 
one of which held the same nationality as the accused. Sitting as 
an international tribunal, the commission could also seek an 
additional commissioner, from a third country, to resolve 
deadlocks. 
President James Monroe’s cabinet considered and rejected 
the British invitation. The reasons for non-participation were 
varied, but constitutional obstacles were a central motivation. 
According to various sources, the “opinion was unanimous . . . 
that it would be repugnant to the article in the Constitution 
concerning the organization of the judicial power.”54 
Although history is complicated and there are good reasons 
to think other issues played an important role in the U.S. 
government’s initial decision to reject the tribunals, key figures 
such as John Quincy Adams invested substantial effort outlining 
the constitutional difficulties with U.S. participation. In 
correspondence, Adams argued that the slave-trade tribunals 
 
 53. Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitutionality of International Courts: The 
Forgotten Precedent of Slave-Trade Tribunals, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 39, 42 (2009). 
 54. Id. at 51 (citing MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, COMPRISING 
PORTIONS OF HIS DIARY FROM 1795 TO 1848, at 217 (Philadelphia, J.B. 
Lippincott & Co. 1875)). 
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were constitutionally questionable because Congress could not 
create courts “irresponsible to the supreme corrective tribunal of 
the American Union.”55 In other words, Article III required at 
least appellate review of a non-Article III tribunal’s decision, and 
no such review existed in the British proposal. 
The precedential value of these early constitutional 
objections is limited due to a Civil War reversal by the U.S. In 
finally joining the treaty in 1862, the U.S. seemed to jettison 
decades of opposition and constitutional concerns. 
Constitutional objections may also have been allayed by a 
decision to limit jurisdiction to vessels, excluding crews.56 
Moreover, the highly delicate nature of Anglo-American 
relations during the first years of the Civil War may also have 
played a role in the U.S. government’s reversal.57 In any event, 
it is still noteworthy that Article III objections to joining the 
tribunals were seriously considered and prevailed for many 
decades. 
It is thus not surprising that similar Article III arguments 
were raised again more than a generation later against U.S. 
participation in another international maritime court—the 
International Prize Court (IPC). Arising out of the Hague 
Conference of 1907, the IPC was established to hear appeals by 
various private parties of prize condemnations or decisions made 
by national courts. It was thought that the new IPC would apply 
international prize law more consistently and neutrally than 
diverse national courts. 
Since the IPC would have the power to review and reverse 
prize decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, serious Article III 
doubts were raised during consideration by the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee.58 Similar doubts were expressed by the 
 
 55. See Letter from John Quincy Adams to Stratford Canning (June 24, 
1823), in WRITINGS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, 1820−1823, at 500 (New York, The 
Macmillan Company 1917) (objecting that the commissions would be “under no 
subordination to the ordinary judicial tribunals of the country”); Letter from 
John Quincy Adams to Albert Gallatin and Richard Rush (Nov. 2, 1818), in 
LETTERS FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR 88 (Washington, Galks & Seaton 1823) 
(noting that the tribunal would be unacceptable because it would “decid[e] upon 
the statutes of the United States without appeal”). 
 56. WRITINGS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, supra note 55, at 500. 
 57. Kontorovich, supra note 53, at 42. 
 58. See George A. Finch, Appellate Jurisdiction in International Cases, 43 
AM. J. INT’L L. 88, 89 (1949) (noting that objections were raised by “eminent 
judges and lawyers and in the Committee on Foreign Relations”). The U.S. legal 
advisor to the Hague Delegation, James Brown Scott, acknowledged an Article 
III constitutional difficulty with the appeal provision, at least under “a strict 
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American delegation to the 1909 London Naval Conference, who 
told other delegates that the U.S. Constitution does not allow 
non-Article III courts to “have the effect of annulling the 
decision” of Article III courts.59 
Eventually, these constitutional doubts and objections 
spurred President Taft’s decision to seek amendments to the 
IPC. These amendments would have allowed the United States 
to reserve to those provisions of the IPC allowing appeal of the 
U.S. court prize decisions. Consequently, an appellant could 
bring a separate IPC proceeding whose jurisdiction was limited 
to claims against the U.S. government, as opposed to individual 
U.S. citizens or vessels. Moreover, unlike the original IPC, the 
amended treaty would have only authorized the court to award 
damages, instead of broader authority to issue substantive 
remedial orders.60 
These historical episodes reflect the significance of Article 
III as a limitation on U.S. participation in an international court. 
Both episodes underscore potential objections grounded in the 
question of final appellate review by a federal U.S. court. While 
constitutional objections were also raised to the delegation of 
judicial power over certain types of rights that one might 
consider private rights, the main consistent constitutional 
objection appears to have been the divestment of federal 
appellate review. 
C. MEDELLÍN AND SANCHEZ-LLAMAS 
Article III challenges were not directly raised in two recent 
Supreme Court decisions considering the domestic effects of an 
International Court of Justice order.61 As this section explains, 
however, concerns over protecting the Article III power animates 
the holdings of these important contemporary analyses of 
international courts’ role in our domestic legal framework. 
The origins of the Medellín and Sanchez-Llamas cases stem 
from a series of lawsuits brought against the United States in 
the International Court of Justice. The ICJ is an international 
 
construction” of the Constitution. See James Brown Scott, The International 
Court of Prize, 5 AM. J. INT’L L. 302, 314 (1911). 
 59. PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL NAVAL CONFERENCE, BRITISH 
PARL. PAP., MISC. NO. 5, at 222 (1909). 
 60. Kontorovich, supra note 53, at 115. 
 61. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 
U.S. 331, 353–54 (2006). 
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court established by the United Nations Charter to resolve 
disputes between states.62 Beginning in 1998, the United States 
was the subject of three separate lawsuits before this tribunal 
alleging U.S. violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (VCCR).63 
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, ratified by 
the United States in 1969, represented the culmination of years 
of negotiation between most countries in the world regarding the 
rights and obligations of consular officials. Under the Vienna 
Convention, a foreign national was granted the right to be 
informed that he has the right to seek consular assistance if 
arrested while travelling abroad.64 This right, and the related 
obligation of the host government to notify the foreign national 
of this right, was an innovation of the Vienna Convention.65 
Additionally, the Vienna Convention obligated states to ensure 
 
 62. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 497. 
 63. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6820 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 64. Id. at art. 36(1). 
 65. Communication and Conduct with Nationals of the Sending State: 
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating 
to nationals of the sending State: 
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the 
sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending 
State shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with 
and access to consular officers of the sending State; 
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State 
shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, 
within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or 
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any 
other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by 
the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be 
forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities 
shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under 
this sub-paragraph; 
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the 
sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and 
correspond with him and to arrange for his legal representation. They 
shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending State who 
is in prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a 
judgment. Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking 
action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if 
he expressly opposes such action. 
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be 
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving 
State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and 
regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for 
which the rights accorded under this Article are intended. 
Id. art. 36. 
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its domestic laws conformed to these requirements. Article 36(2) 
provided that: 
The (notification) rights . . . shall be exercised in 
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving 
State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws 
and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the 
purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article 
are intended.  
The Vienna Convention also contained an ‘Optional 
Protocol’ stating that “disputes arising out of the interpretation 
or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.”66 This 
provision gave the ICJ jurisdiction to resolve disputes between 
states under the Vienna Convention. 
Creative lawyers used the combination of Article 36(2) and 
the Optional Protocol to challenge the convictions and capital 
sentences of certain foreign nationals in the United States. 
Discovering that most U.S. jurisdictions, especially state and 
local law enforcement, failed to comply with Article 36 when 
detaining and arresting foreign nationals, lawyers for foreign 
nationals began to invoke Article 36 in post-conviction habeas 
corpus proceedings, as well as during trials and direct appeals of 
capital convictions.67 
Most U.S. courts rejected the invocation of Article 36 in 
habeas proceedings holding that such claims were “defaulted” 
due to the failure of defendants to raise those claims at their 
trials.68 Other U.S. courts rejected the use of Article 36 during 
trials (or appeals of convictions) holding that this provision of 
the VCCR was either non-self-executing or should be interpreted 
to conform to state and federal law.69 
The unwillingness of U.S. courts to use the VCCR to delay 
or block the implementation of capital sentences did not settle 
the matter, however. The Optional Protocol opened the door for 
 
 66. Vienna Convention, supra note 63, at art. 1 (citing the Optional Protocol 
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes). 
 67. See, e.g., Janet Koven Levit, Does Medellín Matter?, 77 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 617, 620–21, 623 (2008). 
 68. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998); Medellín v. Dreke, 
371 F.3d 270, 279 (5th Cir. 2004); Fisher v. Texas, 169 F.3d 295, 300–01 (5th 
Cir. 1999). 
 69. See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.2d 192, 197 (5th Cir. 
2001). 
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foreign states to bring disputes about the interpretation and 
implementation of Article 36 to the International Court of 
Justice. In a series of remarkable cases, three nations challenged 
the U.S. for its failure to give suitable judicial remedies under 
Article 36. 
Paraguay and Germany brought actions on an emergency 
basis because their foreign nationals were facing imminent 
execution in Virginia and Arizona respectively. Though the ICJ 
issued “provisional measures” calling on the U.S. to take all 
measures to preserve the case on the merits, i.e., stopping the 
executions,70 the U.S. Supreme Court did not give a definitive 
order to execute the ICJ judgment. While the U.S. State 
Department did call upon Virginia and Arizona to consider the 
ICJ’s provisional measures judgment, neither state changed 
course.71 The Supreme Court explicitly refused to act in the first 
Paraguay case, citing concerns as to whether the provisional 
measures order was binding and whether other federal laws 
governing post-conviction habeas challenges superseded its 
domestic effect.72 
Mexico was the third state to invoke the VCCR and the 
Optional Protocol. Unlike the first two cases, Mexico’s action was 
not brought on an expedited basis, but sought a full hearing at 
the ICJ on the proper implementation of Article 36 by the United 
States in the context of foreign nationals facing capital 
punishment. After full briefing and arguments presented by 
both the United States and Mexico, the ICJ held that the U.S. 
must provide a judicial remedy to evaluate the effects of 
violations of Article 36 in post-conviction proceedings by capital 
defendants.73 The Avena ruling therefore squarely put the ICJ 
at odds with most U.S. judicial (and executive) interpretations 
of Article 36. 
The Avena decision sparked a new round of U.S. litigation 
 
 70. See Press Release, International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Ger. v. United States of America) 
(Mar. 3, 1999), http://www.icj-cij.org/ docket/?pr=350&p1=3&p2=3
&p3=6&case=104; Press Release, International Court of Justice, Case 
Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United 
States of America) (Apr. 9, 1998), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket
/index.php?pr=322&code=paus&p1=3&p2=3&p3=6&case=99&k=08. 
 71. See Stephanie Baker, Germany v. United States in the International 
Court of Justice, 30 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 277, 289 (2002). 
 72. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376. See also Levit, supra note 67, at 620 n.18. 
 73. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. United States of 
America), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31, 2004). 
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by foreign nationals seeking adoption of the Avena court’s 
interpretation of Article 36. Instead of only relying on Article 36, 
the new litigation directly invoked the authority of the ICJ over 
the proper interpretation of the Vienna Convention by virtue of 
the Optional Protocol.74 Eventually, the Supreme Court 
considered the effect of Avena in two separate decisions. The 
first, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, involved a direct challenge to a 
non-capital conviction based on violation of Article 36 against a 
Honduran national.75 The second, Medellín v. Texas, involved a 
post-conviction habeas action seeking (per Avena) a judicial 
hearing to consider the effects of the Article 36 violation on the 
Mexican defendants’ conviction and capital sentence.76 In both 
cases, the effect of the ICJ’s interpretation of Article 36 was 
central to the petitioner’s arguments. Both decisions reflected 
substantial constitutional discomfort with giving too much 
weight or force to the ICJ’s interpretation and orders. 
1. Sanchez-Llamas 
In Sanchez-Llamas, the Supreme Court agreed to consider 
three issues: (1) whether Article 36 created an individual right; 
(2) whether violation of this right required suppression of 
evidence collected in violation of this right; and (3) whether post-
habeas challenges based on Article 36 were subject to state law 
“procedural default” provisions requiring such claims to be 
raised at trial.77 The Court, by a 6-3 majority, held that no 
suppression remedy could be required by Article 36 and that 
Article 36 claims were subject to the procedural default rule. The 
Court assumed for the purposes of the decision but did not 
decide, that the VCCR created individual rights.78 
The Court’s holding that Article 36 does not require 
suspension conflicted directly with the ICJ’s interpretation in 
Avena. The Court was aware of this conflict, but offered two 
reasons why it did not have to follow the ICJ. 
First, under the terms of the ICJ Statute, the decisions of 
the ICJ have “no binding force except between the parties and in 
respect of that particular case.”79 The petitioner in Sanchez-
 
 74. Id. 
 75. 548 U.S. 331 (2006). 
 76. 522 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 77. 548 U.S. at 331. 
 78. See id. 
 79. ICJ Statute art. 59. See also Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 354. 
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Llamas was not a Mexican national, and consequently, the 
Avena decision did not bind the United States outside of the 
Mexican context. 
Second, the Court rejected arguments by amici arguing that 
“the United States is obligated to comply with the [VCCR], as 
interpreted by the ICJ.”80 Flatly disagreeing, the Court instead 
announced that ICJ decisions would receive only “respectful 
consideration.”81 Not only was the ICJ decision not binding in 
this particular case, but “[U]nder our Constitution, ‘the judicial 
Power of the United States is vested in one supreme Court, and 
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time 
ordain and establish.’”82 This “judicial Power . . . extend[ed] 
to . . . Treaties,”83 and, as Chief Justice Marshall famously 
explained, “that judicial power includes the duty ‘to say what the 
law is.’”84 Consequently, if treaties are to be given effect as 
federal law, determining their meaning as a matter of federal 
law “is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department,” headed by the “one supreme Court” established by 
the Constitution.85 
After citing authority for its own supremacy in the 
interpretation of treaties, the Court went on to argue that 
nothing in the United Nations Charter, the ICJ Statute, nor the 
VCCR’s Optional Protocol suggested that the ICJ’s decisions 
were intended to bind federal courts or the Supreme Court in its 
interpretation of treaties.86 Additionally, nothing in the history 
of Senate ratification of the U.N. Charter or the Optional 
Protocol suggested otherwise.87 
2. Medellín v. Texas 
At the same time that non-Mexican defendants sought to 
apply the ICJ’s interpretation, Mexican defendants also sought 
Supreme Court review. Unlike the defendants in Sanchez-
Llamas, Mexican defendants facing capital sentences were the 
 
 80. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 353–54. 
 81. Id. at 355–56. 
 82. Id. at 353 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1). 
 83. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2). 
 84. Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 (1 Cranch) U.S. 137, 177 (1803)). 
 85. Id. at 353–54. 
 86. Id. at 354 (stating that the Charter “contemplates quintessentially 
international remedies” for non-compliance) (emphasis original). 
 87. Id. 
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actual subjects of the ICJ’s decision in Avena. There was no 
doubt, therefore, that the ICJ’s decision in Avena was intended 
to be binding on the United States with respect to the Mexican 
defendants.88 Jose Medellín, a Mexican national facing a death 
sentence in Texas, brought the first Avena-related action. 
Medellín’s initial trip to the Supreme Court was delayed 
when President Bush issued a memorandum stating that state 
courts should give effect to the ICJ’s Avena decision out of 
“comity.”89 The Court sent Medellín back to Texas courts to 
litigate the effect of the presidential memorandum.90 When 
Texas courts failed to give effect to either the ICJ’s decision or 
the Presidential memorandum, Medellín returned to the 
Supreme Court arguing that the Court was obligated to give 
effect to the Avena-interpretation of Article 36 and allow a 
judicial hearing for Article 36 claims.91 
This time, the Supreme Court allowed Medellín to present 
his argument on the merits—that the ICJ’s decision in Avena 
required the Supreme Court to change its interpretation of 
Article 36 because the ICJ’s decision was directly enforceable in 
U.S. law. After analyzing the text of the Optional Protocol and 
the U.N. Charter provision setting out the U.S. government’s 
obligation to comply with ICJ judgments, the Court held that the 
ICJ judgment was not directly enforceable.92 In large part, the 
Court relied on its reading of Article 94 of the U.N. Charter, 
which requires United Nations member states to “undertake to 
comply” with judgments of the ICJ.93 The Court held that this 
language could not create a direct domestically enforceable 
obligation when read in the context of the larger structure of the 
Charter for the enforcement of obligations through the Security 
Council.94 Indeed, the Court went so far as to express discomfort 
with the consequences of Medellín’s interpretation, noting that: 
Moreover, the consequences of Medellín’s argument give 
pause. An ICJ judgment, the argument goes, is not only 
 
 88. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. United States of 
America), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31, 2004) (finding 14-1 that United States 
“breached the obligations incumbent upon it under Article 36”). 
 89. Medellín, 522 U.S. at 498, 504. 
 90. See id. at 503. 
 91. Id. at 504. 
 92. Id. at 517. 
 93. U.N. Charter art. 94. 
 94. See Medellín, 522 U.S. at 505. 
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binding domestic law but is also unassailable. As a 
result, neither Texas nor this Court may look behind a 
judgment and quarrel with its reasoning or result.95 
Medellín’s interpretation would allow ICJ judgments to 
override otherwise binding state law; there is nothing in 
his logic that would exempt contrary federal law from the 
same fate. And there is nothing to prevent the ICJ from 
ordering state courts to annul criminal convictions and 
sentences, for any reason deemed sufficient by the ICJ.96 
Curiously, the Court does not fully explain why the 
“consequences” of Medellín’s argument “give pause.” The Court 
states what it finds an obviously problematic result—“ICJ 
judgments . . . overrid[ing] otherwise binding” law or even 
“annull[ing] criminal convictions and sentences.”97 In the next 
paragraph, the majority drew attention to the fact that the 
dissent was also uncomfortable with this result since it seemed 
to interfere with the role of the political branches in conducting 
foreign affairs.98 However, the Court did not fully divulge the 
sources of its discomfort with Medellín’s preferred result.99 
Read together with Sanchez-Llamas, nevertheless, it is 
likely that one source of discomfort is the tension between the 
petitioners’ arguments and the Court’s designation of itself as 
the supreme arbiter of federal law. Therefore, the likely, but 
unstated reason that the Court was “given pause” was the notion 
that the Court’s own interpretation of Article 36 must be 
reversed as a result of the ICJ’s interpretation. 
To be sure, there is reason to doubt that the Court was ready 
to announce a rule preventing the enforcement of an 
international court judgment. As the Court acknowledged in 
Medellín, “We do not suggest that treaties can never afford 
binding domestic effect to international tribunal judgments—
only that the U.N. Charter, the Optional Protocol, and the ICJ 
Statute do not do so.”100 
However, the Court also rejected arguments that the 
 
 95. We already know, from Sanchez-Llamas, that this Court disagrees with 
both the reasoning and result in Avena. 
 96. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 517–18. 
 97. Id. at 518. 
 98. See id. at 565–66 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority 
decision “unnecessarily complicate[d] the President’s foreign affairs task.”). 
 99. See id. 
 100. Id. at 519. 
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enforcement of an international tribunal judgment could be 
analogized to routine enforcement of a foreign court judgment. 
To the contrary, the Court noted that “the general rule . . . is that 
judgments of foreign courts awarding injunctive relief, even as 
to private parties, let alone sovereign States, ‘are not generally 
entitled to enforcement.’”101 
In so many words, the Court emphasized the extraordinary 
nature of the rule that Medellín was seeking to have the court 
adopt. The Supreme Court was being asked to give automatic 
enforcement—the equivalent of injunctive relief against a 
sovereign state on a matter of public policy—to a judgment of an 
international court. The Court’s narrow reading of the relevant 
treaties seemed influenced by its discomfort with Medellín’s 
claimed-for rule. 
3. Summary 
Although neither Sanchez-Llamas nor Medellín drew a 
constitutional ‘red line’ against giving international courts’ 
judgments broad effect within the U.S. system, both decisions 
found a way to avoid giving the ICJ any automatic legal force 
within the United States. The caution and “pause” that 
characterized both decisions has a deeper historical pedigree 
than was generally acknowledged. Through avoiding 
foundational Article III objections, the Court was able to dodge 
issues that will reoccur in the future. In the next Part, this Essay 
will argue that the Law of the Sea’s Dispute Settlement system 
will present a far less avoidable clash with Article III than the 
treaties that served as the basis for Sanchez-Llamas and 
Medellín. 
IV. ARTICLE III AND UNCLOS DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
The UNCLOS Dispute Settlement system has two 
provisions which create potential constitutional conflicts with 
federal judicial power. First, like the ICJ provisions considered 
in Sanchez-Llamas and Medellín, UNCLOS mandates that all 
states-parties comply with the decision of any UNCLOS court or 
tribunal that holds jurisdiction over a particular dispute.102 
 
 101. Id. at 522 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
OF THE U.S. § 481 cmt. b.). 
 102. See UNCLOS art. 296. 
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Second, UNCLOS mandates that the judgments of the Sea-Bed 
Disputes Chamber be given automatic direct enforcement by 
U.S. courts without national appellate review.103 Each of these 
provisions present clear Article III difficulties that will be more 
challenging to avoid than the provisions considered in the ICJ 
cases. 
A. UNCLOS BINDING DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
As discussed in Part II supra, UNCLOS creates a 
complicated system of dispute settlement that requires states 
parties to agree to binding adjudication of disputes under the 
Convention. Although the parties have choices as to which kind 
of dispute settlement to agree to, UNCLOS makes clear that all 
forms of dispute settlement create binding obligations among 
the parties. Article 296 states, “Any decision rendered by a court 
or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall be final 
and shall be complied with by all the parties to the dispute.”104 
It is worth comparing the language of this provision to 
Article 94 of the United Nations Charter, which was the main 
basis for the attempt to enforce the ICJ Avena decision in U.S. 
law: 
1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to 
comply with the decision of the International Court of 
Justice in any case to which it is a party. 
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations 
incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the 
Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security 
Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make 
recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to 
give effect to the judgment.105 
As discussed above, the Medellín Court emphasized that the 
phrase “undertakes to comply” did not necessarily denote 
immediate enforcement of an ICJ judgment.106 When combined 
with Article 94(2)’s provision for “recourse to the Security 
 
 103. See UNCLOS art. 187. 
 104. UNCLOS art. 296. 
 105. U.N. Charter art. 94. 
 106. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 517. 
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Council,” the Medellín Court found that there was no reason to 
think domestic courts had an obligation to enforce decisions 
automatically.107 
Unlike Article 94 of the UN Charter, Article 296 of UNCLOS 
uses the phrases “final” and “shall be complied with by all 
parties to the dispute.”108 This direct language, along with the 
lack of a Security Council “enforcement” provision analogous to 
Article 94(2), would make it much more problematic for the 
Supreme Court to interpret Article 296 to avoid an Article III 
quandary.109 
Indeed, the “final” and “shall be complied with” language is 
not only exacting, but it is also much more binding than other 
international tribunals to which the U.S. belongs. For example, 
the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) has the power to order “recommendations” for how a 
party in violation of the various WTO agreements must bring its 
laws and regulations “into conformity with that agreement.”110 
Indeed, it is clear under U.S. law that the judgments of the WTO 
dispute settlement body have no direct effect on judgments of 
U.S. courts, although they are typically implemented by new 
congressional legislation or administrative rulemaking.111 
In contrast, a United States court considering the legality of 
a detained vessel would note that it is bound to “comply” with an 
order from a UNCLOS tribunal for the prompt release of that 
vessel. The obligation to comply with the UNCLOS tribunal 
order has no exceptions and would not allow review by federal 
courts—i.e., the word “final” suggests no further appeal or 
review is permitted.112 
 
 107. Id. (citing U.N. Charter art. 94). 
 108. UNCLOS art. 296. 
 109. See ICJ Statute art. 59 (“The decision of the Court has no binding force 
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”); id. at art. 
60 (“The judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of dispute as to the 
meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request 
of any party.”). 
 110. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, annex II, art. 19. 
 111. It is worth noting that even the Rome Statute creating the 
International Criminal Court (which the U.S. has not ratified) does not contain 
language as direct as UNCLOS. Under Article 87 of Rome Statute, the ICC may 
make a finding of non-compliance of a member state, after which it “may” refer 
the matter to the Assembly of State Parties or to the Security Council. Rome 
Statute to the ICC, art. 87(7). Any other dispute between ICC member states is 
also referred to the Assembly for further action. See Rome Statute art. 119(2). 
 112. See UNCLOS art. 296. 
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As discussed supra, this creates tension with Article III, 
especially since UNCLOS tribunals hold jurisdiction over 
matters as diverse as fishing practices, actions on the high seas, 
scientific research of the marine environment, and intrusions 
into territorial seas or exclusive economic zones. While most 
would likely involve public rights, it is also possible that private 
rights could be implicated in UNCLOS arbitral proceedings. 
UNCLOS requires states-parties to submit any disputes 
“concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention” 
to UNCLOS dispute settlement.113 Private activities with 
respect to fishing, undersea resources extraction, or scientific 
research (among others) could fall within a UNCLOS 
proceeding. Since all matters would involve the interpretation of 
UNCLOS, federal courts would ordinarily have the judicial 
power over the interpretation of the treaty. Article 296’s clear 
designation of all UNCLOS tribunal decisions as “final” 
arguably precludes reserving such powers to the U.S. courts. At 
the very least, the Supreme Court would strain to find a narrow 
interpretation of the phrase “final . . . decision” in a way that 
would reserve final review in federal courts. 
Even if one re-framed a UNCLOS award or judgment as 
analogous to a foreign court judgment, the “finality” obligation 
under UNCLOS seems substantially more onerous than that 
imposed by a foreign court judgment. Although U.S. courts 
routinely enforce judgments of foreign courts, the Supreme 
Court has made it clear that such enforcement is made out of 
comity rather than binding obligation toward those foreign 
courts.114 Indeed, it is not even clear that the law governing the 
enforcement of foreign judgments is federal as opposed to a 
matter of individual state common law. In any event, most 
American federal and state courts will refuse to enforce foreign 
judgments that lack “due process” or which violate other public 
policy of the forum.115 This admittedly limited review is still 
more than what would seem to be required by a UNCLOS 
judgment. 
 
 113. UNCLOS art. 286. 
 114. See Hilton v. Guvot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895). 
 115. Yuliya Zeynalova, The Law of Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 150, 158 (2013) (noting that most federal 
and state courts will follow a comity-type standard when considering foreign 
judgments). 
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B. SEA-BED DISPUTES CHAMBER 
The constitutional conflict with the UNCLOS Sea-Bed 
Disputes Chamber is even more pronounced. As discussed in 
Part II, the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber holds exclusive 
jurisdiction over disputes involving the sea-bed outside of 
national jurisdictions. As a tribunal under Article 296, states-
parties must also comply with the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber’s 
decisions. UNCLOS goes further and demands that “[t]he 
decisions of the Chamber shall be enforceable in the territories 
of the States Parties in the same manner as judgments or orders 
of the highest court of the State Party in whose territory the 
enforcement is sought.”116 
The language of this provision is much more unequivocally 
in conflict with the U.S. Constitution’s Article III’s requirement 
of appellate review of any non-Article III tribunal. By the plain 
terms of Annex VI, Article 39, there is no possibility of any 
domestic court questioning or reviewing a decision of the Sea-
Bed Disputes Chamber.117 Any such decisions must be given 
automatic enforcement “in the same manner” as judgments of 
the “highest court of the State Party in whose territory the 
enforcement is sought.”118 That “highest court” would be the 
United States Supreme Court. 
The removal of appellate review appears to be a serious 
problem under Article III. By explicitly removing this possibility, 
UNCLOS has squarely presented a constitutional challenge of 
the same kind that troubled U.S. decision makers in the slave-
trade tribunal and International Prize Court contexts. 
Compounding the difficulties, the Sea-Bed Disputes 
Chamber, unlike the other UNCLOS tribunals, holds 
jurisdiction over private parties and individuals in any legal 
disputes with states-parties or the Authority managing the sea-
bed.119 In other words, it is almost certain, given the Sea-Bed 
Disputes Chambers’ jurisdiction over contract interpretation 
and similar matters that private rather than public rights will 
be subject to adjudication. The fact that private individual rights 
are at stake in Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber matters only 
heightens the Article III difficulty created by this unique 
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institution. 
V. CONCLUSION: NON-COMPLIANCE OR 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
It bears emphasizing that the constitutional difficulties 
facing the participation of the United States in UNCLOS are not 
necessarily fatal to U.S. participation. As John Yoo and I have 
argued elsewhere, treating all such provisions as non-self-
executing can mitigate many of the Article III tensions identified 
in Part III by giving Congress the duty to determine how and 
whether the U.S. will comply with UNCLOS tribunal 
judgments.120 Moreover, the U.S. is already a participant in at 
least one dispute resolution system, which also calls for 
automatic non-appealable enforcement—the International 
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).121 
Although no such enforcement action has ever been brought 
under the ICSID in the U.S., the fact that the U.S. has long been 
a part of ICSID suggests that Congress and the President may 
not be troubled by the Article III implications of this 
arrangement. 
As discussed supra, however, the Medellín and Sanchez-
Llamas decisions should prompt a second look at the legality of 
U.S. participation in international tribunals. In particular, the 
removal of appellate review poses a serious challenge to the 
supremacy of federal courts required by Article III. Unless 
Congress deviates from UNCLOS when it enacts a statute 
implementing this agreement, the United States is faced with 
the prospect of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber adjudicating 
private rights without any possibility of appellate review by the 
Supreme Court. On a lesser scale, Americans could also be faced 
with ITLOS provisional measures orders and UNCLOS arbitral 
awards that are “final” and binding on U.S. federal courts. 
The United States government appears to be planning to 
delay and postpone the constitutional question as long as 
 
 120. See JULIAN KU & JOHN YOO, TAMING GLOBALIZATION: INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 87–101 (2012). 
 121. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 1650(a) (2015) (“An award of an arbitral tribunal 
rendered pursuant to chapter IV of the [Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes] shall create a right arising under a treaty of the United 
States. The pecuniary obligations imposed by such an award shall be enforced 
and shall be given the same full faith and credit as if the award were a final 
judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of one of the several States.”). 
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possible. In its analysis of UNCLOS for the Senate, the U.S. 
State Department declared that it would treat UNCLOS as a 
whole and the Seabed Disputes Chamber provisions, in 
particular, as “non-self-executing.”122 This approach only 
postpones rather than resolves the constitutional issue. By 
acceding to the treaty, the U.S. takes on a clear and specific 
obligation to comply with UNCLOS awards and to give Seabed 
Disputes Chamber judgments the effect of its “highest court.” 
Moreover, the legal status of ITLOS provisional measures 
awards or UNCLOS arbitration awards are not directly 
discussed by the State Department’s analysis. 
The plan, therefore, appears to be that the U.S. will join 
UNCLOS at some point without enacting legislation to carry out 
its settlement obligations. If the U.S. simply refuses to execute 
those dispute settlement obligations, it would be in violation of 
its obligations under UNCLOS and would be subject to criticism 
and sanctions from states-parties to UNCLOS. Thus, if the U.S. 
joins UNCLOS, the country will be under pressure to implement 
its dispute settlement obligations via legislation. 
The U.S. will likely face a dilemma—enacting legislation to 
give direct effect to UNCLOS awards and orders, or avoiding the 
constitutional difficulties by refusing to comply with its 
UNCLOS dispute settlement obligations. The latter path is how 
the U.S. proceeded in the Medellín ICJ cases and it is the likely 
strategy if the U.S. joins UNCLOS. 
The goal of this Essay was to establish that constitutional 
objections to joining UNCLOS with respect to dispute settlement 
are far from frivolous and are a serious impediment to 
participation. Even if it is a surmountable obstacle that the 
United States will solve by simply refusing to carry out its 
international obligations, it is an obstacle that needs to be taken 
seriously by both sides of the debate over ratification. 
Simply joining the Convention with the intention of non-
compliance is disrespectful of both UNCLOS and the other 
member states of the treaty. Instead, the U.S. should make clear 
upon its accession that the U.S. will interpret both UNCLOS 
dispute settlement provisions to be consistent with the U.S. 
Constitution. It has made similar interpretive declarations upon 
joining the U.N. human rights treaties and it has even limited 
the effect of a treaty’s dispute resolution provision by such a 
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declaration. For example, when the U.S. joined the International 
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD), the U.S. declared that it would treat 
that treaty’s binding dispute resolution provisions as requiring 
its “specific intent” before any action could be brought to the 
ICJ.123 Even though no other country has adopted such an 
interpretation of the Convention, the U.S. was able to join the 
treaty.  
Similarly, the U.S. limitation on UNCLOS dispute 
settlement could do no more than simply declare that it reads 
both UNCLOS dispute settlement obligations to be non-self-
executing, as the U.S. government currently proposes. Rather, it 
could add a declaration that it reads Articles 287 and 296 to be 
consistent with the supremacy of the federal judicial power 
under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Moreover, any 
implementing legislation would further clarify that before any 
UNCLOS judgments are found binding on the U.S., they are 
subject to final review by the U.S. Supreme Court consistent 
with Article III. This approach would thus allow the U.S. to join 
UNCLOS but signal to other members that there are limitations 
on its participation as a result of the U.S. Constitution.  
UNCLOS may or may not be worth joining. There are good 
arguments on both sides. But the constitutional problems with 
U.S. accession has been largely ignored or glossed over by the 
legal academy. This Essay has identified a real constitutional 
conflict between Article III and the dispute resolution provisions 
of UNCLOS. It has also suggested a possible way to overcome 
the conflict that is superior to the current U.S. approach.  
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